ADMINISTRATIVE MESSAGE

PRIORITY

P 131500Z AUG 99   ZYB PSN 224197M25

FM USS DETROIT

TO CNO WASHINGTON DC//N00/N09/N6/N43/N45//
COMNAVSEASYSCOM WASHINGTON DC//03N/04M/05K/PMS325//
PRESINSURV NORFOLK VA//00/01/03//

INFO ASSTSECNAV RDA WASHINGTON DC//SP//
PEO EXW WASHINGTON DC//
BUMED WASHINGTON DC//02/24//
CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA//N00/N01/N43/N42//
COMNAVSURFLANT NORFOLK VA//N00/N01/N4/N6/N42/N43//
NAVICP MECHANICSBURG PA//NAVICP-04//
COMNAVSUPSYSCOM MECHANICSBURG PA//51//
NAVMEDLOGCOM FT DETRICK MD//03//
NWASTA CORONA CA//QA33//
COMSC WASHINGTON DC//N00/N01/N3/N7/PM1/PM2//
COMSCLANT NORFOLK VA//N7//
COMSPAWARSYSCOM SAN DIEGO CA//00/03/09/PMW152//
COMSPAWARSYSCOM SAN DIEGO CA//00/03/09/PMW152//
NAVAIRWARCENACDIV LAKEHURST NJ//4.8.11//
NAVSURFWARCEN SHIPSYSENGSTA PHILADELPHIA PA//9750//
SPAWARSYSCEN CHARLESTON DET NORFOLK VA//JJJ//
SPAWARSYSCEN SAN DIEGO CA//D643/D641//
NAVY JAG WASHINGTON DC//31//
COMOPTEVFOR NORFOLK VA//40//
COMNAVSAFECEN NORFOLK VA//00/30//
SERVSCOLCOM GREAT LAKES IL//JJJ//
COMAFLOATRAGRULANT NORFOLK VA//00//
SWOSCOLCOM NEWPORT RI//60//
INSURVPAC SAN DIEGO CA//00//
INSURVLANT NORFOLK VA//00//
COMREGSUPPGRU NORFOLK VA//00/01/N43//
FTSCLANT NORFOLK VA//4100//
COMLOGRON TWO

***THIS IS A 2 SECTIONED MSG COLLATED BY MDS***
UNCLAS//N04730//

MSGID/GENADMIN/DETROIT/-/AUG//

SUBJ/QUICKLOOK REPORT FOR USS DETROIT (AOE 4) UNDERWAY MATERIAL
INSPECTION (UMI)//

RMKS/1. THE BOARD OF INSPECTION AND SURVEY ATLANTIC CONDUCTED A
UMI IN USS DETROIT (AOE 4) AT NAVAL WEAPONS STATION, EARLE, NJ
DURING THE PERIOD 9-13 AUGUST 1999.  IN HER PRESENT CONDITION,
USS DETROIT IS UNSAFE FOR UNDERWAY OPERATIONS.  FITNESS FOR
FURTHER SERVICE WILL BE DEPENDENT UPON CORRECTION OF THOSE
MISSION DEGRADING AND SAFETY RELATED DISCREPANCIES DELINEATED IN
THE BOARD'S REPORT.  A POST REPAIR AVAILABILITY UMI SHOULD BE
CONDUCTED TO DETERMINE FITNESS FOR FURTHER SERVICE NOT MORE THAN
60 DAYS FOLLOWING COMPLETION OF REPAIRS.

2. SENIOR MEMBER COMMENTS:

A. USS DETROIT IS SERIOUSLY DEGRADED IN THE MAJORITY OF HER
MISSION AREAS.  DURING THE UNDERWAY PORTION OF THE UMI, THE SHIP
COULD ONLY ACHIEVE A STANDARD BELL IN THE AHEAD DIRECTION AND A
ONE THIRD BACKING BELL BEFORE DESIGNED PLANT PARAMETERS WERE
EXCEEDED.  SEVERAL AUTOMATIC PLANT CONTROL FEATURES WERE OUT OF
COMMISSION AND HAD TO BE MANUALLY OPERATED.  MOST ROTATING
MACHINERY HAD EXCESSIVE LEAKOFF AND, ALTHOUGH FORMAL VIBRATION
ANALYSIS WAS NOT CONDUCTED, SOME PUMPS OBVIOUSLY HAD EXCESSIVE
VIBRATION.  ADDITIONALLY, THE SHEER MAGNITUDE OF STEAM AND WATER
LEAKS THROUGHOUT BOTH MAIN PROPULSION SPACES LED TO EXCESSIVE
HEAT STRESS CONDITIONS AND POSED A SIGNIFICANT SAFETY HAZARD TO
PLANT OPERATORS.  PIPING AND VALVES WERE EXTREMELY DETERIORATED.
FEEDWATER CONSUMPTION EXCEEDED 75 PERCENT OF THE REDUCED OUTPUT
OF BOTH EVAPORATORS.  ONE ANCHOR WINDLASS AND ONE STEERING UNIT
FAILED OPERATIONAL DEMONSTRATIONS.  THREE CLASS CHARLIE FIRES AND
ONE MAJOR FUEL OIL LEAK OCCURRED DURING THE UMI.
B. THE SHIP REPORTED SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF AN UNDERWAY UMI
REHEARSAL, INCLUDING LEVEL I FLEXES ON ALL FOUR BOILERS, A
SATISFACTORY FULL POWER TRIAL AND UNREP SERVICES TO AT LEAST ONE
CUSTOMER SHIP THE WEEK PRIOR TO THE BOARD'S ARRIVAL.  IN VIEW OF
THE CONDITIONS NOTED ABOVE, THE CONCLUSION DRAWN IS THAT THE SHIP
IS NOT CAPABLE OF AN ACCURATE SELF ASSESSMENT AND WILL REQUIRE
OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE IN ANY PLANNING AND ESTIMATING PROCESS FOR A
REPAIR PACKAGE.  BECAUSE THE PROPULSION PLANT WAS NOT OBSERVED
UNDER FULL LOAD CONDITIONS, IDENTIFIED DISCREPANCIES MAY NOT
INCLUDE OTHER MAJOR MATERIAL DEFICIENCIES THAT WOULD ONLY BE
REVEALED AT HIGH POWER.
C. THE CONDITION OF THE REPLENISHMENT WINCHES IS OF MAJOR
CONCERN. ALTHOUGH MOST COULD BE OPERATED, SEVERE CORROSION WAS
RAMPANT AND THE MATERIAL CONDITION AND RELIABILITY OF SAFETY
DEVICES SUCH AS LIMIT SWITCHES AND ANTI-SLACK DEVICES
QUESTIONABLE.  MOST WINCHES HAD AT LEAST ONE MAJOR ELECTRICAL
SAFETY DISCREPANCY. THESE WERE TYPICALLY DRAMATIC IN NATURE,
EITHER EXPOSING OPERATORS TO POTENTIAL DIRECT CONTACT WITH HIGH
VOLTAGE CIRCUITS OR RENDERING EQUIPMENT SUSCEPTIBLE TO GROUNDING
WHEN EXPOSED TO INCLEMENT WEATHER OR EXCESSIVE MOISTURE.  THESE
ELECTRICAL SAFETY DEFICIENCIES MUST BE CORRECTED PRIOR TO FURTHER
OPERATION.
D. CORROSION THROUGHOUT THE SHIP WAS EXCESSIVE AND WELL BEYOND
SHIP'S FORCE CAPABILITY TO REPAIR AND CONTROL.  THE SHIP IS NOT
WATERTIGHT AND AT LEAST TWO MAIN SPACE ESCAPE TRUNKS WERE NOT
FUME TIGHT.  STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE HULL AND DECKING IS ALSO
SUSPECT IN SEVERAL AREAS.
E. MOST WEAPONS SYSTEMS WERE DEGRADED OR OUT OF COMMISSION.  THE
DTE SEQUENCE WAS CONDUCTED WITH ONLY A SINGLE CIWS MOUNT. THE
COST OF RESTORING COMBAT SYSTEMS COMPONENTS TO DESIGN OPERATING
CONDITIONS MAY BE SIGNIFICANT.

3.  REQUIRED OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES (ROC): THE SHIP WAS
DEGRADED IN 15 OF THE 20 PRIMARY/SECONDARY ROCS EVALUATED.

4.  DEMONSTRATION RESULTS:
- THE SELF DEFENSE DETECT-TO-ENGAGE WAS DEGRADED BECAUSE THE MK29
NATO SEA SPARROW LAUNCHER, THE MK91 MISSILE FIRE CONTROL SYSTEM
"A" AND CIWS MT 21 WERE INOP.
- THE FULL POWER TRIAL WAS NOT CONDUCTED BECAUSE OF A CASUALITY
TO NR 2B BOILER.
- THE QUICK REVERSALS AHEAD AND ASTERN WERE UNSATISFACTORY
BECAUSE NR 1 MAIN ENGINE LOST VACUUM, THE HIGH WATER ALARM
SOUNDED ON NR 1A BOILER AND NRS 2A1 AND 2A2 FORCED DRAFT BLOWER
(FDB) BEARINGS OVERHEATED.  THESE REVERSALS WERE CONDUCTED AT
REDUCED SPEEDS.
- THE STEERING DEMONSTRATION WAS UNSATISFACTORY BECAUSE THE
BLOCKING VALVE TEST FAILED.
- THE ANCHOR DROP TEST WAS UNSATISFACTORY BECAUSE THE PORT ANCHOR
FAILED TO FREE FALL FROM THE HAWSE OR THE VERTICAL POSITION.

5.  PRESERVATION, CLEANLINESS AND STOWAGE (ON (LOW) 1 - 5 (HIGH)
SCALE):
- PRESERVATION WAS 1.95.
- CLEANLINESS WAS 2.23.
- STOWAGE WAS 2.44.

6.  SIGNIFICANT MATERIAL DEFICIENCIES INCLUDE:
A. HULL:
- UNDERWAY REPLENISHMENT STATIONS 3,4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12,
14, 16 AND 18 HAD MAJOR ELECTRICAL SAFETY DEFICIENCIES ON
WINCHES, CONTROLLERS AND ASSOCIATED HARDWARE.
- UNDERWAY REPLENISHMENT STATION WINCHES AND ASSOCIATED
EQUIPMENT/COMPONENTS (FOUNDATIONS/SECURING
FASTENERS/COVERS/SPRINGS/ETC) WERE EXTENSIVELY CORRODED AND
EXFOLIATED.
- COUNTER-MEASURE WASHDOWN (CMWD) WAS SEVERELY DEGRADED DUE TO AN
EXCESSIVE NUMBER OF MISSING/BROKEN PIPES, NOZZLES, AND FITTINGS.
B. PROPULSION:
- NR 2 MAIN ENGINE HIGH PRESSURE TURBINE LABYRINTH SEALS LEAKED
EXCESSIVELY.
- ALL FOUR (1A1, 1A2, 2A1 AND 2A2) ONLINE FDB OVERHEATED DURING
OPERATION.
- NR 1B BOILER WAS OOC BECAUSE A MAJOR FUEL OIL LEAK OCCURRED ON
THE DISCHARGE SIDE OF 1B FUEL OIL SERVICE PUMP.
- NR 2B BOILER WAS OOC DUE TO AN INOP DRUM SAFETY VALVE.
- THERE WAS A SEVERE STEAM LEAK ON NR 2B BOILER DRUM LEVEL
TRANSMITTER LINE.
- NR 1A MAIN FEED BOOSTER PUMP (MFBP) WAS OOC DUE TO AN INOP
GOVERNOR.
- NR 1 EMERGENCY FEED PUMP (EFP) WAS OOC DUE TO A MAJOR STEAM
LEAK.
- NRS 2A AND 2B MFBP HAD SEVERE STEAM SEAL LEAKAGE.
- NR 1 AND NR 2 MAIN ENGINE GLAND SEAL SYSTEMS DID NOT OPERATE IN
AUTOMATIC.
- NR 1 STEAM DRIVEN LUBE OIL PUMP SHAFT SEAL LEAKED EXCESSIVELY.
- ALL SEA WATER PUMPS IN BOTH MMR 1 AND MMR 2 HAD EXCESSIVE SHAFT
SEAL/PACKING GLAND LEAK-OFF.
- NUMEROUS UPPER LEVEL AND LOWER LEVEL DRAINS IN BOTH MMR 1 AND
MMR 2 WERE NOT PIPED TO FUNNELS CAUSING EXCESSIVE FEEDWATER USAGE
AND A HAZARD TO PERSONNEL.
- THERE WAS AN EXCESSIVE AMOUNT OF DAMAGED, DETERIORATED OR
MISSING INSULATION AND LAGGING THAT CONTRIBUTED TO HEAT STRESS
CONDITIONS AND PRESENTED BURN HAZARDS TO PERSONNEL.
- BILGE AND DECK PLATE/MACHINERY FOUNDATIONS/SUPPORTS WERE
RUSTED AND EXFOLIATED.
C. COMBAT SYSTEMS:
- THE MAJORITY OF CARGO MAGAZINE SPACES HAD SUBSTANTIAL LIGHTING
DEFICIENCIES THAT HINDERED THE SAFE HANDLING OF ORDNANCE.
- 39 OF 39 PIECES OF MECHANICAL HANDLING EQUIPMENT HAD AT LEAST
ONE MAJOR DEFICIENCY, AND 19 WERE UNSAFE OR OUT OF SERVICE.
- NUMEROUS WEAPONS ELEVATOR FORKTRUCK GUARDS AND PERSONNEL SAFETY
BARRIERS WERE INOP.
- ALL MAGAZINE SPRINKLER PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE GAUGES WERE OUT
OF CALIBRATION.
- VALVES AND PIPING TO THE NATO SEASPARROW MAGAZINE SPRINKLING
SYSTEM WERE DETERIORATED AND HAD SUBSTANTIAL LEAKAGE WHEN
ACTUATED.
- NSSMS AND CIWS HAD SUBSTANTIAL DISCREPANCIES IN ELECTRONIC
COOLING WATER. A DETERMINATION COULD NOT BE MADE WHETHER THESE
WEAPONS SYSTEMS WERE BEING ADEQUATELY COOLED.
- SLQ-32 PASSIVE AND ACTIVE CAPABILITIES WERE SIGNIFICANTLY
DEGRADED.  8 OF 8 WAVEGUIDES FAILED TO HOLD PRESSURE.
- THE SLA-10 BLANKING DEVICE COULD NOT UNBLANK SEVERAL RADARS,
AND WAS MISSING FIELD CHANGE 2 WHICH BLOCKS CIWS HIGH PRF.
- 3 OF 4 HF TRANSMITTERS WERE INOP.
- THE IFF TRANSPONDER WAS INOP, AND THE TAS RADAR IFF
INTERROGATOR WAS INOP (CORRECTED).
D. AVIATION:
-FLIGHT DECK AND HANGAR BAY NON SKID HAD RUST BLEED THRU AND WAS
EXCESSIVELY WORN WITH A REDUCED PROFILE.
-2 OF 3 HANGAR DOORS WERE INOP.
-THE STABILIZED GLIDE SLOPE INDICATOR WAS INOP.
-PORT AND STBD APPROACH LINEUP LIGHT SYSTEMS WERE INOP.
-28 VDC HELO SERVICE SYSTEM WAS INOP.
E. NAVOSH/EP:
- TORN AND DETERIORATED LAGGING POSED A POTENTIAL ASBESTOS HEALTH
HAZARD.
- COMPRESSED GAS CYLINDER STORAGE RACKS DID NOT ACCOMMODATE
DIFFERENT SIZE CYLINDERS AND COULD NOT SAFELY SECURE CYLINDERS.
- ALL REQUIRED SAFETY PROGRAMS SUCH AS ASBESTOS, HEAT STRESS,
LEAD, RESPIRATORY PROTECTION, AND HAZARD ABATEMENT WERE NOT
ADEQUATELY DOCUMENTED AND WERE INEFFECTIVE.
- THE SHIP WAS NOT ADEQUATELY SEGREGATING PLASTIC FROM OTHER
MATERIALS FOR DISPOSAL.
- THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION PROGRAM WAS NOT ESTABLISHED.
- 2 OF 2 CHT TANK MANHOLE COVERS INSPECTED WERE NOT PROVIDED WITH
A MONEL ½ INCH GAS SAMPLING VALVE.
- THE RECIRCULATING BROMINATOR WAS INOPERATIVE DUE TO A MISSING
PUMP MOTOR.
F. ELECTRICAL:
- NR 4 SSTG CIRCUIT BREAKER PREMATURELY CLOSED TWICE WHEN POWER
WAS APPLIED TO THE MOTOR CUTOUT SWITCH.
- NR 2 SSTG REVERSE POWER RELAY WAS INOP.
- 4 OF 4 SHIPS SERVICE GENERATOR WINDINGS REQUIRED INDUSTRIAL
CLEANING.
- CATHODIC PROTECTION SYSTEM DID NOT OPERATE IN THE AUTOMATIC
MODE.
G. AUXILIARIES:
- NR 1 AND 2 DISTILLING UNITS PRODUCED LESS THAN 60% OF RATED
CAPACITY.
- NR 1 HPAC WAS INOP.
- NR 2A A/C WAS INOP.
- NR 3 CARGO REEFER COMPRESSOR WAS INOP.
- NR 2 SHIP SERVICE REEFER WAS INOP.
- NR 4 FIREPUMP WAS INOP.
- 2 OF 4 PACKAGE CONVEYORS WERE INOP.
- RUDDERPOST BEARINGS WERE WORN.
- 2 OF 7 HOT WATER HEATERS EXCEEDED 140 DEG F.
H. QOL:
- THE LAUNDRY OPERATED AT 1/3 CAPACITY.
- 18 PIECES OF GALLEY EQUIPMENT WERE INOP.
- CARGO DECKS, SPECIFICALLY REEFERS, WERE IN POOR MATERIAL
CONDITION.
- THERE WERE NUMEROUS ELECTRICAL SAFETY DISCREPANCIES THROUGHOUT
THE SHIP, INCLUDING BERTHING COMPARTMENTS.

7.  RADM SCHMIDT, PRESINSURV, TOURED THE SHIP DURING THE UMI.
ADDITIONALLY, VADM GIFFIN, COMNAVSURFLANT, ATTENDED THE DEBRIEF.
CAPT DENIS, SENIOR INSPECTOR, SENDS.//

BT
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